

# 量子暗号の形式的検証のための 確率双模倣

久保田 貴大<sup>\*</sup>, 角谷 良彦<sup>\*</sup>,  
加藤 豪<sup>†</sup>, 河野 泰人<sup>†</sup>, 櫻田 英樹<sup>†</sup>

<sup>\*</sup>東京大学情報理工学系研究科,  
<sup>†</sup>NTTコミュニケーション科学基礎研究所

# 量子暗号の形式的検証のための 近似双模倣

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# 背景

- 暗号安全性証明の検証は難しい
  - 古典暗号に対しては, 検証のための形式体系やツールが開発・適用されている
- 形式的検証は, 量子暗号に対しても有用
  - 複雑な安全性証明がある [Mayers'98]
  - 今後も, さまざまなプロトコルが提案される可能性がある

# 本研究の目標


- 量子プロセス計算qCCSを,  
Shor-PreskillのBB84の安全性証明に適用すること
  - プロセス計算は並行システムを記述するのに適している
    - qCCSには, プロセスの双模倣の概念がある [Feng+'11]
  - Shor-Preskillの証明は,  
最もシンプルな安全性証明のひとつ [Shor-Preskill'00]

# Outline of Shor-Preskill proof of BB84

BB84



Alice




Bob

# Outline of Shor-Preskill proof of BB84

BB84



Alice




Bob

EDP-based




Alice



Bob

# Outline of Shor-Preskill proof of BB84

BB84




# Outline of Shor-Preskill proof of BB84

BB84



Alice



Bob

public *classical* channel

public *quantum* channel

(1) Prove equivalence

~~EDP-based~~



Alice



Bob

public *classical* channel

public *quantum* channel

private *classical* channel

(2) Prove security




# Our formal verification

BB84



Alice




Bob

EDP-based



Alice



Bob

# Our formal verification

BB84



Alice

EDP-based

qCCSの枠組みで  
形式化 (FAIS2012春)

Alice

```
process BB84
((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
c6?u_A.
abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
copy1[b1_A,B_A].
c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
meas b2_A then
cnot[r1_A,x_A].
copyn[x_A,X_A].
cnot_and_swap[x_A,r1_A].
```

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```
process EDPbased
((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
measure[q1_A].
c6?u_A.
abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
copy1[b1_A,B_A].
c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
meas b2_A then
css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
copyn[x_A,X_A].
css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
```

annel

annel

annel

annel



Bob

双模倣の自動検証  
(FAIS2013春)

# Our formal verification

BB84



Alice

```
process BB84
((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
c6?u_A.
abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
copy1[b1_A,B_A].
c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
meas b2_A then
cnot[r1_A,x_A].
copyn[x_A,X_A].
cnot_and_swap[x_A,r1_A].
```

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annel



双模倣の自動検証  
(FAIS2013春)

EDP-based

qCCSの枠組みで  
形式化(FAIS2012春)

Alice

```
process EDPbased
((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
measure[q1_A].
c6?u_A.
abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
copy1[b1_A,B_A].
c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
meas b2_A then
css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
copyn[x_A,X_A].
css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
```

pu

pu

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annel



Bob

EDP-ideal



Alice

public classical channel

public quantum channel

private classical channel



Bob

# Our formal verification

BB84



Alice

```
process BB84
  ((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
  shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
  c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
  copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
  copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
  c6?u_A.
  abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
  copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
  copy1[b1_A,B_A].
  c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
  meas b2_A then
  cnot[r1_A,x_A].
  copyn[x_A,X_A].
  cnot_and_swap[x_A,r1_A].
```

put

annel

public



双模倣の自動検証  
(FAIS2013春)

```
process EDPbased
  ((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
  shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
  c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
  copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
  copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
  measure[q1_A].
  c6?u_A.
```

put

annel



EDP-based

qCCSの枠組みで

形式

安全性が自明に成り立つプロトコル

AliceとBobは、事前にEPRペアを共有

EDP-ideal



Alice

classical channel

public quantum channel

private classical channel



Bob

# Our formal verification

BB84



Alice

```
process BB84
((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
c6?u_A.
abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
copy1[b1_A,B_A].
c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
meas b2_A then
cnot[r1_A,x_A].
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```

pub

pub

annel



双模倣の自動検証  
(FAIS2013春)

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```
process EDPbased
((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
measure[q1_A].
c6?u_A.
abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
copy1[b1_A,B_A].
c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
meas b2_A then
css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
copyn[x_A,X_A].
css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
```

pu

pub

pri

annel

annel

annel



Bob

qCCSの枠組みで  
形式化(FAIS2012春)

Alice

EDP-ideal



Alice

public classical channel

public quantum channel

private classical channel



Bob

# Our formal verification

BB84



Alice

```
process BB84
  ((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
  shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
  c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
  copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
  copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
  c6?u_A.
  abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
  copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
  copy1[b1_A,B_A].
  c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
  meas b2_A then
  cnot[r1_A,x_A].
  copyn[x_A,X_A].
  cnot_and_swap[x_A,r1_A].
```

pub

annel



双模倣の自動検証  
(FAIS2013春)

EDP-based

```
process EDPbased
  ((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
  shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
  c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
  copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
  copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
  measure[q1_A].
  c6?u_A.
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  copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
  copy1[b1_A,B_A].
  c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
  meas b2_A then
  css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
  copyn[x_A,X_A].
  css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
```

pu

annel



qCCSの枠組みで  
形式化

Alice

近似双模倣の自動検証

EDP-ideal

```
process EDP-ideal
  ((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
  shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
  c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
  copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
  copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
  measure[q1_A].
  c6?u_A.
  abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
  copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
  copy1[b1_A,B_A].
  c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
  meas b2_A then
  css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
  css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
```

pub

annel



Bob



Alice

public

annel

priv

annel

qCCSをツール用に  
簡略化した枠組み

# 本研究の貢献

- 非決定的qCCSのコンフィギュレーションたちに対して、**近似双模倣関係**を定義した
  - 並行合成に関して閉じている
    - $\langle P, \rho \rangle \sim \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$  ならば  $\langle P || R, \rho \rangle \sim \langle Q || R, \sigma \rangle$
  - 安全性証明に適用可能
- 検証ツールを拡張し、Shor-Preskillの証明の後半部分に適用した

# Outline

- Quantum process calculus qCCS
- Nondeterministic qCCS
- Approximate bisimulation
- Application to Shor-Preskill's security proof
- Experiment



# Outline

- Quantum process calculus qCCS
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# Syntax of qCCS [Feng+'11]

Quantum  
communication

$P, Q ::= \text{nil} \mid c?x.P \mid c!e.P \mid c?q.P \mid c!q.P$

$\text{if } b \text{ then } P \text{ fi} \mid \text{op}[\tilde{q}].P \mid M[\tilde{q}; x].P \mid P \parallel Q \mid P \setminus L$

Quantum operation

Measurement

$e$  : real expression

$b$  : boolean expression on real numbers

$q$  : quantum variable

$M$  : Hermitian operator

$\text{op}$  : TPCP map

$\tilde{q}$  : sequence of quantum variables

$L$  : set of channels

# Configuration

- A pair  $\langle P, \rho \rangle$  of a process  $P$  and a quantum state  $\rho$

$$\underbrace{\langle c!q_B.M[q_A;x].nil, |+\rangle}_{P} \underbrace{\langle +|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E}_{\rho}$$

where  $\rho_E$  is the outsider's arbitrary state

$$|+\rangle := \frac{|0\rangle + |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$$

# Probabilistic labeled transition

- $\langle P, \rho \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \mu$ 
  - A configuration  $\langle P, \rho \rangle$  performs an action  $\alpha$  and transits to a probability distribution  $\mu$  on configurations

$\rho$  is a distribution on **quantum states**

$\mu$  is a distribution on **configurations**

# Probabilistic labeled transition


$$1 \langle \underline{c!q_B}.M[q_A; x].\text{nil}, |+\rangle \langle +|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

Sends  $q_B$  to the outside through  $c$

$\downarrow c!q_B$

$$1 \langle \underline{M[q_A; x].\text{nil}}, |+\rangle \langle +|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

Measures  $q_A$



$1/2$

$1/2$


$$\langle \text{nil}, |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle \quad \langle \text{nil}, |1\rangle \langle 1|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

# Probabilistic labeled transition

$$1 \langle \mathbf{c!}q_B.M[q_A; x].\mathbf{nil}, |+\rangle \langle +|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

$\downarrow \mathbf{c!}q_B$

$$1 \langle M[q_A; x].\mathbf{nil}, |+\rangle \langle +|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$



Only measurement causes a prob. branch

$1/2$

$1/2$

$$\langle \mathbf{nil}, |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle \quad \langle \mathbf{nil}, |1\rangle \langle 1|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

# Probabilistic labeled transition

$$1 \langle c!q_B.M[q_A; x].\text{nil}, |+\rangle \langle +|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

Visible action  
from the outside

$\downarrow c!q_B$

$$1 \langle M[q_A; x].\text{nil}, |+\rangle \langle +|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

Invisible action  
from the outside

$\tau$   $\tau$

$1/2$

$$\langle \text{nil}, |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle \quad \langle \text{nil}, |1\rangle \langle 1|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

# Bisimulation Relation

- Two configurations  $\langle P, \rho \rangle, \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$  are **bisimilar**, written  $\langle P, \rho \rangle \approx \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$ , if
  1.  $qv(P) = qv(Q)$  and  $\text{tr}_{qv(P)}(\rho) = \text{tr}_{qv(Q)}(\sigma)$  hold  
-- namely, **the states that the outsider can access** are the same
  2. For any outsider's operation  $E$  acting on  $qVar - qv(P)$ , Each transition of  $\langle P, E\rho \rangle$  is **"simulated"** by those of  $\langle Q, E\sigma \rangle$  **up to  $\tau$  transitions**



# Bisimulation Relation

- Two configurations  $\langle P, \rho \rangle, \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$  are **bisimilar**, written  $\langle P, \rho \rangle \approx \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$ , if

- $qv(P) = qv(Q)$  and  $\text{tr}_{qv(P)}(\rho) = \text{tr}_{qv(Q)}(\sigma)$  hold

-- namely **the states that the outside sees** are the same

$$\langle \underbrace{c!q_B.M[q_A; x].\text{nil}}_P, |+\rangle \langle +|_{q_A} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_{q_B} \otimes \underbrace{\rho_E}_\rho \rangle$$

のとき,

$$\text{tr}_{qv(P)}(\rho) = \rho_E$$


# Bisimulation Relation

- Two configurations  $\langle P, \rho \rangle, \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$  are **bisimilar**, written  $\langle P, \rho \rangle \approx \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$ , if
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
# Example of Bisimulation




# Example of Bisimulation




# Example of Bisimulation




# Example of Bisimulation



# Example of Bisimulation




# Example of Bisimulation






# Example of Bisimulation



# Example of Bisimulation



# Outline

- Quantum process calculus qCCS
- **Nondeterministic qCCS**
- Approximate bisimulation
- Application to Shor-Preskill's security proof
- Experiment

# Simplification of Syntax

- $M[q; x]$  and **if** must always be written together

$M[q; x].\text{if } x = 1 \text{ then } P \text{ fi} \implies \text{meas } q \text{ then } P \text{ saem}$

$P, Q ::= \text{discard}(\tilde{q}) \mid c!q.P \mid c?q.P \mid \text{op}[\tilde{q}].P$   
 $\mid P \parallel Q \mid \underline{\text{meas } q \text{ then } P \text{ saem}} \mid P \setminus L$

$q$  must be a qubit

# Simplification of syntax

$$\langle \text{meas } q \text{ then } c!r.P \text{ saem}, | + 0 \rangle \langle + 0 |_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$




1/2

$$\langle \text{discard}(r, \dots), |00\rangle \langle 00 |_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$



1/2

$$\langle c!r.P, |10\rangle \langle 10 |_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$



$$1/2 \langle P, |10\rangle \langle 10 |_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

# Simplification of operational semantics

$$\langle \text{meas } q \text{ then } c!r.P \text{ saem}, | + 0 \rangle \langle + 0 |_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

probability to reach here

1/2


$$\langle \text{discard}(r, \dots), \underline{|00\rangle \langle 00|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E} \rangle$$

trace is 1

1/2

$$\langle c!r.P, |10\rangle \langle 10|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

$$1/2 \langle P, |10\rangle \langle 10|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$



# Simplification of operational semantics


- Excluded probability from the transition system by extending the def. of configurations

$$\langle \text{meas } q \text{ then } c!r.P \text{ saem}, | + 0 \rangle \langle + 0 |_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$



$$\langle \text{discard}(r, \dots), \mathbf{1/2} (|00\rangle \langle 00|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E) \rangle \langle c!r.P, \mathbf{1/2} (|10\rangle \langle 10|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E) \rangle$$

trace is 1/2  
probability to reach here



$$\langle P, \mathbf{1/2} (|10\rangle \langle 10|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E) \rangle$$

# Simplified formal framework

- We call **nondeterministic qCCS**
- $M[q; x].\text{if } x = 1 \text{ then } P \text{ fi} \implies \text{meas } q \text{ then } P \text{ saem}$
- Transition system is only nondeterministic
  - For a configuration  $\langle P, \rho \rangle$ ,  
 $\text{tr}(\rho)$  is **the probability to reach it**  
and the quantum state is  $\frac{\rho}{\text{tr}(\rho)}$



# Outline

- Quantum process calculus qCCS
- Nondeterministic qCCS
- **Approximate bisimulation**
- Application to Shor-Preskill's security proof
- Experiment

# Our formal verification

BB84



Alice

```
process BB84
((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
c6?u_A.
abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
copy1[b1_A,B_A].
c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
meas b2_A then
cnot[r1_A,x_A].
copyn[x_A,X_A].
cnot_and_swap[x_A,r1_A].
```

pub

annel



双模倣の自動検証  
(FAIS2013春)

EDP-based

```
process EDPbased
((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
measure[q1_A].
c6?u_A.
abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
copy1[b1_A,B_A].
c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
meas b2_A then
css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
copyn[x_A,X_A].
css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
```

pu

annel



近似双模倣の自動検証


qCCSの枠組みで  
形式化(FAIS2012春)

Alice

```
process EDP-ideal
((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
measure[q1_A].
c6?u_A.
abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
copy1[b1_A,B_A].
c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
meas b2_A then
css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
```

pri

annel



Bob

EDP-ideal



Alice

public

annel

priv

annel

# Trace distance

- $d(\rho, \sigma) := \frac{1}{2} \text{tr}|\rho - \sigma|$ , where  $|A| = \sqrt{A^\dagger A}$
- Examples
  - $d(|0\rangle\langle 0|, |+\rangle\langle +|) = \frac{1}{2}$
  - $d(|0\rangle\langle 0|^{\otimes n}, |+\rangle\langle +|^{\otimes n}) = 1 - \frac{1}{2^n}$

# Approximate Bisimulation

- Two configurations  $\langle P, \rho \rangle, \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$  are **approximately bisimilar**, written  $\langle P, \rho \rangle \sim \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$ , if
  1.  $qv(P) = qv(Q)$  hold and  $d\left(\text{tr}_{qv(P)}(\rho), \text{tr}_{qv(Q)}(\sigma)\right)$  is **negligible**
  2. For any outsider's operation  $E$  acting on  $qVar - qv(P)$ ,  $\langle P, E\rho \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle P', \rho' \rangle$  holds and  $\text{tr}(\rho')$  is **non-negligible**,  $\langle Q, E\sigma \rangle \xrightarrow{\tau^*} \xrightarrow{\hat{\alpha}} \xrightarrow{\tau^*} \langle Q', \sigma' \rangle$  and  $\langle P', \rho' \rangle \sim \langle Q', \sigma' \rangle$  hold for some  $\langle Q', \sigma' \rangle$ , and conversely

# Properties of approximate bisimulation

- The relation  $\sim$  is an equivalence relation
- If  $\langle P, \rho \rangle \sim \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$  holds, then  $\langle P || R, \rho \rangle \sim \langle Q || R, \sigma \rangle$  holds for all process  $R$

# Application of the property

- Multiple session

$\langle P, \rho \otimes \rho_E \rangle \sim \langle Q, \sigma \otimes \rho_E \rangle$  for all  $\rho_E$ , and

$\langle P', \rho' \otimes \rho'_E \rangle \sim \langle Q', \sigma' \otimes \rho'_E \rangle$  for all  $\rho'_E$

implies


$\langle P || P', \rho \otimes \rho''_E \rangle \sim \langle Q || Q', \sigma \otimes \rho''_E \rangle$  for all  $\rho''_E$

# Outline


- Quantum process calculus qCCS
- Nondeterministic qCCS
- Approximate bisimulation
- **Application to Shor-Preskill's security proof**
- Experiment

# Application to QKD protocols

EDP-based




EDP-ideal






# Application to QKD protocols

EDP-based



EDP-ideal




- $\text{tr}(\rho')$  is non-neg.
- $\text{tr}(\rho'')$  is non-neg.
- $\text{tr}(\rho''')$  is neg.

# Application to QKD protocols

EDP-based

EDP-ideal




- $\text{tr}(\rho')$  is non-neg.
- $\text{tr}(\rho'')$  is non-neg.
- $\text{tr}(\rho''')$  is neg.

# Application to QKD protocols

EDP-based

EDP-ideal



$\text{tr}(\rho')$  is non-neg.  
 $\text{tr}(\rho'')$  is non-neg.  
 $\text{tr}(\rho''')$  is neg.

Trace distances are negligibly small

# Property of distance of probability-weighted density matrices

- If  $d(\rho, \sigma)$  is negligible, then
  - $|\text{tr}(\rho) - \text{tr}(\sigma)|$  is negligible and
  - $|\text{tr}(\rho)\text{tr}\left(\pi \frac{\rho}{\text{tr}(\rho)}\right) - \text{tr}(\sigma)\text{tr}\left(\pi \frac{\sigma}{\text{tr}(\sigma)}\right)|$  is negligible for all projector  $\pi$
  - For a configuration  $\langle P, \rho \rangle$ ,
    - $\text{tr}(\rho)$  is the probability to reach  $\langle P, \rho \rangle$
    - $\frac{\rho}{\text{tr}(\rho)}$  is the quantum state

## Property of distance of

pr

Joint probability that

the configuration reaches  $\langle P, \rho \rangle$  and

- If obtain the measurement result corresponding to  $\pi$

$|\text{tr}(\rho) - \text{tr}(\sigma)|$  is negligible and

$$\left| \text{tr}(\rho) \text{tr} \left( \pi \frac{\rho}{\text{tr}(\rho)} \right) - \text{tr}(\sigma) \text{tr} \left( \pi \frac{\sigma}{\text{tr}(\sigma)} \right) \right| \text{ is}$$

negligible for all projector  $\pi$

– For a configuration  $\langle P, \rho \rangle$ ,

- $\text{tr}(\rho)$  is the probability to reach  $\langle P, \rho \rangle$
- $\frac{\rho}{\text{tr}(\rho)}$  is the quantum state

# Application to QKD

- If  $d(\rho, \sigma)$  is negligible, then  
 $|\text{tr}(\rho) - \text{tr}(\sigma)|$  is negligible and  
 $|\text{tr}(\rho)\text{tr}\left(\pi_i \frac{\rho}{\text{tr}(\rho)}\right) - \text{tr}(\sigma)\text{tr}\left(\pi_i \frac{\sigma}{\text{tr}(\sigma)}\right)|$  is neg.

Let

This is 1/2

$\rho$  : a final state of an execution of EDP-based

$\sigma$  : a final state of an execution of EDP-ideal

$\pi_i$  : the projector to the subspace where

$i$ -th bits of Alice's and Eve's key are equal

# Application to QKD

- If  $d(\rho, \sigma)$  is negligible, then  
 $|\text{tr}(\rho) - \text{tr}(\sigma)|$  is negligible and  
 $|\text{tr}(\rho)\text{tr}\left(\pi_i \frac{\rho}{\text{tr}(\rho)}\right) - \text{tr}(\sigma)\text{tr}\left(\pi_i \frac{\sigma}{\text{tr}(\sigma)}\right)|$  is neg.

We can derive that

This is 1/2

$|\text{p}(k_{A,i} = k_{E,i}) - 1/2|$  is negligible for all  $i$ .

# Outline

- Quantum process calculus qCCS
- Nondeterministic qCCS
- Approximate bisimulation
- Application to Shor-Preskill's security proof
- **Experiment**



# Verifier2

- Checks  $\langle P, \rho \rangle \sim \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$
- Input:
  - $\langle P, \rho \rangle, \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$
  - A set of equations  $eqs$
  - A set of indistinguishability expressions  $inds$
- Output: *true* or *false*

# プロトコルの形式化

```
process EDPbased
  ((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
  shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
  c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
  copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
  copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
  measure[q1_A].
  c6?u_A.
  abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
  copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
  copy1[b1_A,B_A].
  c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
  meas b2_A then
    css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
    copyn[x_A,X_A].
    css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
    measure[r1_A].
    c8!x_A.d4!X_A.
    c9!z_A.barrier!f_A.
    cka!r1_A.
    discard(q1_A,b2_A,a_A,
            u_A,v1_A,v_B)
  saem
  ||
  c1?q_B.c2?r_B.
  c3!a_B.d5!A_B.
  c4?t_B.unshuffle[q_B,r_B,t_B].
  c5?s_B.hadamards[q_B,r_B,s_B].
  measure[q_B].
  copyn[q_B,Q_B].c6!q_B.d6!Q_B.
  c7?b_B.
  meas b_B then
    c8?x_B.c9?z_B.
    css_syndrome[r_B,x_B,z_B,
                 sx_B,sz_B].
    css_correct[r_B,sx_B,sz_B].
    css_decode[r_B,x_B,z_B].
    measure[r_B].
    barrier?f_B.
    ckb!r_B.
    discard(b_B,s_B,t_B,x_B,
            z_B,sx_B,sz_B,f_B)
  saem)/{c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8,
  c9, barrier})
end
```

# プロトコルの形式化

```
environment EDPbased_ENV
  EPR[q1_A,q2_A] * EPR[r1_A,r2_A]
  * RND_2n[s_A] * RND_N[t_A] *
  Z_1[b1_A] * Z_1[b2_A] * Z_n[x_A]
  * Z_n[z_A] * Z_2n[S_A] *
  Z_N[T_A] *
  Z_1[B_A] * Z_n[X_A] * Z_1[f_A]
  * Z_1[a_B] * Z_1[A_B] * Z_n[Q_B]
  * Z_n[sx_B] * Z_n[sz_B]
  * EVE[q_E] * Z_n_n[v1_A,v_B]
  * EVE1[q_B] * EVE2[r_B]
end
```

```
configuration EDPbased
  proc EDPbased
    env EDPbased_ENV
  end
```

# プロトコルの形式化

```
process EDP-IDEAL
  ((hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A].
    shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A].
    c1!q2_A.c2!r2_A.c3?a_A.
    copyN[t_A,T_A].c4!t_A.d1!T_A.
    copy2n[s_A,S_A].c5!s_A.d2!S_A.
    measure[q1_A].
    c6?u_A.
    abort_alice[q1_A,u_A,b1_A].
    copy1[b1_A,b2_A].
    copy1[b1_A,B_A].
    c7!b1_A.d3!B_A.
    meas b2_A then
      css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
      css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A].
      copyn[x_A,X_A].
      measure[r1_A].
      c8!x_A.d4!X_A.
      c9!z_A.
      create_key[rx_A,r1_A].
      barrier!f_A.
      cka!r1_A.
      discard(q1_A,b2_A,
saem      a_A,u_A,rx_A)
```

```
||
  c1?q_B.c2?r_B.
  c3!a_B.d5!A_B.
  c4?t_B.unshuffle[q_B,r_B,t_B].
  c5?s_B.hadamards[q_B,r_B,s_B].
  measure[q_B].
  copyn[q_B,Q_B].c6!q_B.d6!Q_B.
  c7?b_B.
  meas b_B then
    c8?x_B.c9?z_B.
    css_syndrome[r_B,x_B,
      z_B,sx_B,sz_B].
    css_correct[r_B,sx_B,sz_B].
    css_decode[r_B,x_B,z_B].
    measure[r_B].
    create_key[rx_B,r_B].
    barrier?f_B.
    ckb!r_B.
    discard(b_B,s_B,t_B,x_B,z_B,
      sx_B,sz_B,f_B,rx_B)
saem)/{c3, c4, c5, c6,
      c7, c8, c9, barrier}
```

end

# プロトコルの形式化

```
environment EDP-IDEAL_ENV
  EPR[q1_A,q2_A] * EPR[r1_A,r2_A]
  * RND_2n[s_A] * RND_N[t_A]
  * Z_1[b1_A] * Z_1[b2_A]
  * Z_n[x_A]
  * Z_n[z_A] * Z_2n[S_A]
  * Z_N[T_A]
  * Z_1[B_A] * Z_n[X_A] * Z_1[f_A]
  * Z_1[a_B] * Z_1[A_B] * Z_n[Q_B]
  * Z_n[sx_B] * Z_n[sz_B]
  * EVE[q_E]
  * EVE1[q_B] * EVE2[r_B]
  * EPR[rx_A,rx_B]
end

configuration EDP-IDEAL
  proc EDP-IDEAL
    env EDP-IDEAL_ENV
  end
```

# ユーザ定義近似式

```
indistinguishable E1 n
Tr[b1_A,b2_A,q1_A,q_B,r_B,rx_A,rx_B,s_A,t_A,x_A,z_A](
  create_key[rx_A,r1_A](proj1[b1_A](measure[r1_A](
    copyn[x_A,X_A](css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A](
      css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A](proj1[b2_A](
        copy1[b1_A,B_A](copy1[b1_A,b2_A](
          abort_alice[q1_A,q_B,b1_A](measure[q1_A](
            copyn[q_B,Q_B](measure[q_B](
              hadamards[q_B,r_B,s_A](copy2n[s_A,S_A](
                unshuffle[q_B,r_B,t_A](copyN[t_A,T_A](
                  __[q2_A,r2_A,q_E,q_B,r_B](
                    shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A](hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A](
                      EPR[q1_A,q2_A] * EPR[r1_A,r2_A] * EPR[rx_A,rx_B] *
                      RND_2n[s_A] * Z_2n[S_A] * RND_N[t_A] * Z_N[T_A] *
                      Z_1[b1_A] * Z_1[b2_A] * Z_1[B_A] * Z_n[Q_B] *
                      Z_n[x_A] * Z_n[X_A] * Z_n[z_A] *
                      __[q_B] * __[r_B] * __[q_E]
                    )))))))))))
                )))))))))))
            )))))))))))
        )))))))))))
    )))))))))))
  )))))))))))
)
=
Tr[b1_A,b2_A,q1_A,q_B,r_B,s_A,t_A,x_A,z_A](
  proj1[b1_A](measure[r1_A](
    copyn[x_A,X_A](css_decode[r1_A,x_A,z_A](
      css_projection[r1_A,x_A,z_A](proj1[b2_A](
        copy1[b1_A,B_A](copy1[b1_A,b2_A](
          abort_alice[q1_A,q_B,b1_A](measure[q1_A](
            copyn[q_B,Q_B](measure[q_B](
              hadamards[q_B,r_B,s_A](copy2n[s_A,S_A](
                unshuffle[q_B,r_B,t_A](copyN[t_A,T_A](
                  __[q2_A,r2_A,q_E,q_B,r_B](
                    shuffle[q2_A,r2_A,t_A](hadamards[q2_A,r2_A,s_A](
                      EPR[q1_A,q2_A] * EPR[r1_A,r2_A] *
                      RND_2n[s_A] * Z_2n[S_A] * RND_N[t_A] * Z_N[T_A] *
                      Z_1[b1_A] * Z_1[b2_A] * Z_1[B_A] * Z_n[Q_B] *
                      Z_n[x_A] * Z_n[X_A] * Z_n[z_A] *
                      __[q_B] * __[r_B] * __[q_E]
                    )))))))))))
                )))))))))))
            )))))))))))
        )))))))))))
    )))))))))))
  )))))))))))
)
end
```

# Environment of the experiment

- Panasonic CF-J9  
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU  
M460 @ 2.53GHz, 1GB memory

# Results

	BB84~EDP	EDP~ideal
eqs	6	0
inds	0	24
time (sec)	39.50	112.50
proc. calls	1039	907



# 今後の課題

- 等式・近似式の正しさの形式的検証
- qCCSの枠組みにおける近似双模倣関係の定義
- 非決定的qCCSの近似双模倣関係の健全性の考察
- 他のプロトコルへの適用
  - B92, six-state protocol



# Approximate Bisimulation

- Two configurations  $\langle P, \rho \rangle, \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$  are **approximately bisimilar**, written  $\langle P, \rho \rangle \sim \langle Q, \sigma \rangle$ , if
  1.  $qv(P) = qv(Q)$  hold and  $d\left(\text{tr}_{qv(P)}(\rho), \text{tr}_{qv(Q)}(\sigma)\right)$  is **negligible**
  2. For any outsider's operation  $E$  acting on  $qVar - qv(P)$ ,  $\langle P, E\rho \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle P', \rho' \rangle$  holds and  $\text{tr}(\rho')$  is **non-negligible**,  $\langle Q, E\sigma \rangle \xrightarrow{\tau^*} \xrightarrow{\hat{\alpha}} \xrightarrow{\tau^*} \langle Q', \sigma' \rangle$  and  $\langle P', \rho' \rangle \sim \langle Q', \sigma' \rangle$  hold for some  $\langle Q', \sigma' \rangle$ , and conversely

# Simplification of operational semantics

$$\langle \text{meas } q \text{ then } c!q.P \text{ saem}, | + 0 \rangle \langle + 0 |_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

probability to reach here

1/2


$$\langle \text{discard}(r, \dots), \underline{|00\rangle \langle 00|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E} \rangle$$

trace is 1

1/2

$$\langle c!r.P, |10\rangle \langle 10|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$

$$1/2 \langle P, |10\rangle \langle 10|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$



# Simplification of operational semantics


- Excluded probability from the transition system by extending the def. of configurations

$$\langle \text{meas } q \text{ then } c!q.P \text{ saem}, | + 0 \rangle \langle + 0 |_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E \rangle$$



$$\langle \text{discard}(r, \dots), \mathbf{1/2} (|00\rangle \langle 00|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E) \rangle \langle c!r.P, \mathbf{1/2} (|10\rangle \langle 10|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E) \rangle$$

trace is 1/2  
probability to reach here




$$\langle P, \mathbf{1/2} (|10\rangle \langle 10|_{q,r} \otimes \rho_E) \rangle$$

# Application to QKD protocols

EDP-based

EDP-ideal



$\text{tr}(\rho')$  is non-neg.  
 $\text{tr}(\rho'')$  is non-neg.  
 $\text{tr}(\rho''')$  is neg.

Trace distances are negligibly small

# Verifier2


If  $\langle P, E[\tilde{r}](\bar{\rho}) \rangle$   $\begin{matrix} \xrightarrow{\tau} \\ \xrightarrow{\tau} \end{matrix}$   $\langle P_1, \bar{\rho}_1 \rangle$   
 $\langle P_2, \bar{\rho}_2 \rangle$  by measure,

it searches  $\langle Q_1, \bar{\sigma}_1 \rangle$  and  $\langle Q_2, \bar{\sigma}_2 \rangle$  such that


$\langle Q, E[\tilde{r}](\bar{\sigma}) \rangle \xrightarrow{\tau^*} \langle Q_1, \bar{\sigma}_1 \rangle$   
 $\langle Q, E[\tilde{r}](\bar{\sigma}) \rangle \xrightarrow{\tau^*} \langle Q_2, \bar{\sigma}_2 \rangle$  } Not limited form

and  $\langle P_1, \bar{\rho}_1 \rangle \approx_{\text{Verifier2}} \langle Q_1, \bar{\sigma}_1 \rangle$  and  
 $\langle P_2, \bar{\rho}_2 \rangle \approx_{\text{Verifier2}} \langle Q_2, \bar{\sigma}_2 \rangle$

# Verifier1

If  $\langle P, E[\tilde{r}](\bar{\rho}) \rangle$ 

by measure,

it searches  $\langle Q_1, \bar{\sigma}_1 \rangle$  and  $\langle Q_2, \bar{\sigma}_2 \rangle$  such that



and  $\langle P_1, \bar{\rho}_1 \rangle \approx_{\text{Verifier1}} \langle Q_1, \bar{\sigma}_1 \rangle$  and  
 $\langle P_2, \bar{\rho}_2 \rangle \approx_{\text{Verifier1}} \langle Q_2, \bar{\sigma}_2 \rangle$